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NORTH ESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
DONALD G. BAIRD, Editor
CORROBORATION OF A CONFESSION [FEDERAL]
It has long been the boast of certain
members of the legal profession that most
law-suits can be won on procedural ques-
tions, without recourse to the substantive
law of the case. The attitude, too often,
has been, hew to the rules, let the facts
fall where they may. Of course, all law-
yers do not intentionally adhere to this
practise, but for several years before the
passage of the new rules of civil procedure
for Federal courts, 49.8 per cent of all cases
were disputes over procedure. Solicitor
General (now Attorney General) Robert
Jackson then expressed the hope that the
new rules would permit lawyers to cease
devoting half their time "not to what the
decision should be, but to how a decision
should be reached." I
Few will contend that our courts have
habitually endeavored to avoid a deci-
sion of a case on its merits; but the fact,
too often, has been that rules of procedure
become so firmly entrenched in the judicial
mind, that the court is inexorably led to
its conclusion-that the substance must
bow to the procedure. Sometimes, it may
be that the necessity for the rule is long
past, and its retention is a stumbling-block
in the path of justice. The late Mr. Justice
Holmes made this pertinent observation:
"It is one of the misfortunes of the law that
'Address by Solicitor General Robert H.
Jackson broadcast on the National Radio Forum,
November 21, 1938.
2 Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347,391 (1912).
s Gulotta v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 683
(C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
4 Criminal Code, §79; 18 USCA §141 (1927), 35
Stat. 1103 (1909).
5 Certain elemental distinctions must be kept
in mind. We are here dealing with extrajudicial
confessions and admissions-those given outside
of court, before trial, either orally or in writing.
ideas become encysted in phrases and
thereafter for a long time cease to provoke
further analysis." 2
In the recent decision, Gulotta v. United
States,3 the defendant was tried for falsely
representing himself to be a citizen of the
United States for a fraudulent purpose; 4
the indictment charged that he subscribed
to an oath that he was a citizen of the
United States, for the purpose of having
his name enrolled upon the register of
qualified voters, when in reality he was
not a citizen. At the trial in the District
Court, the government introduced the
Affidavit of Registration filed by defendant
on February 3, 1938, in which he declared
that he was born in the state of Louisiana
in 1896. To prove the defendant was not
a citizen, the government introduced an
extrajudicial confession, 5 which was a
written statement signed by defendant be-
fore a naturalization examiner on Decem-
ber 1, 1938. In it he declared that he was
born in Campobello, Italy, in 1896, of
Italian parents; that he had told the elec-
tion commissioners that he was born in
Louisiana; that he knew he was born in
Italy; and that he fraudulently represented
himself to be a citizen of the United States
for the purpose of voting. To corroborate
this confession, the government introduced
Judicial confessions are in effect a plea of guilty
and entirely another matter.
A distinction between confessions and admis-
sions is recognized. A confession is a declaration
made by the accused admitting his guilt in the
crime. An admission is a statement, either direct
or-implied, of facts tending to show guilt of de-
fendant; he does not admit his guilt, but he
admits facts and circumstances which, if taken
in connection with other facts, may permit an




(1) a signed declaration of intention to
become a citizen stating that the defendant
was born in Campobello, Italy, filed in the
office of the clerk of the District Court of
Kansas City in November, 1918; (2) a
second declaration of intention filed by de-
fendant after his registration as a qualified
voter; and (3) a passport delivered to the
naturalization officer at the time of the
second declaration, purporting to have
been issued to defendant by the King of
Italy in 1903, stating that he was born in
Campobello, Italy.
Defendant was convicted in the District
Court, appealed, and the Circuit Court re-
versed. Both the Circuit Court and the
District Court followed the rule that extra-
judicial confessions, or admissions, are not
sufficient to authorize a conviction of crime
unless corroborated by independent evi-
dence of the corpus delicti.6 This rule
owes its conception to a growing humani-
tarianism among criminal law judges of the
1700s. In that day, when the accused in a
criminal case was without benefit of coun-
sel, could not testify at his own trial, and
appeal was not allowed, it was small won-
der that fair-minded judges seized upon
any pretext to prevent apparent miscarri-
ages of justice. 7 One such pretext, which
grew to have the stature of a rule, was
that a confession was the weakest form
of evidence and should not be admitted.
At the same time, however, other legal
scholars asserted it was the highest form
( For citation to state cases, Wigmore, Evi-
dence (3rd ed. 1940), §2071, ns. 3 and 4; Massa-
chusetts alone is definitely contra; Common-
wealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 297, 1 N. E. (2d)
189 (1936).
Cases sustaining this rule in the Federal courts,
are: Isaacs v. United States, 159 U. S. 487 (1895);
Flower v. United States, 116 Fed. 241 (C. C. A.
5th, 1902); Naftzger v. United States, 200 Fed.
494 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); Goff v. United States,
257 Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919); Martin v. United
States, 264 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Forlini v.
United States, 12 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1926) ;
Tingle v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 573 (C. C. A.
8th, 1930); Pon Wing Quong v. United States,
111 F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
7 For a refreshing discussion of the rise, and
present place of this rule in our courts, see
Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940), §§865-867.
s Wigmore, Evidence, §866, p. 369 (italics
added).
9 Federal courts have not been unanimous in
their decisions as to whether the rule of cor-
of evidence. In the words of Mr. Wigmore,
"This seems to be the simple explanation
of the apparently contradictory views; if
we distinguish the confession as evidence
from the evidence of the confession, we
find that few have ever really doubted
that the first is in itself of the highest
value, while the second is always sus-
pected."
Out of a desire for justice, coupled with
a misunderstanding of this fundamental
distinction, the rule developed and fast-
ened itself on the law-that there must
be corroboration of a confession. 9 Who
can say that at the time it was formulated,
it did not serve a salutory purpose or at
least supply a formula by which could be
turned aside the ends of manifest injus-
tice? The modern criminal case, however,
is a far cry from that by-gone era; today,
if a confession is involuntary-that is, ob-
tained by threats or promises, or actual
force-it is a matter for counsel to bring
before the court, and for the judge, either
to reject the doubtful "confession," or to
instruct the jury as to its evidentiary
value.10 When the judge has done the
latter it would seem the jury could fairly
decide whether all the evidence establishes
the guilt of the accused beyond a reason-
able doubt. Under such a system where
a confession must be proved voluntary,
there can be no need for a rule that re-
quires independent evidence of the corpus
delicti.1 Nevertheless, the rule was carried
roboration might apply only to the confession,
or must be corroboration of the corpus delicti.
It is immaterial to this discussion, inasmuch as
we accept the stricter form of the rule for the
sake of argument-that there must be inde-
pendent evidence of the corpus delicti. The fol-
lowing cases hold corroboration of the confession
alone sufficient: United States v. Williams et al.,
1 Cliff 5, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,707 (1858); Pearlman
v. United States, 10 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 9th,
1926); Wynkoop v. United States, 22 F. (2d) 799
(C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
1o Wharton, Criminal Evidence (l1th Ed. 1935),
§597, p. 990.
11 "The policy of any rule of the sort is ques-
tionable. No one doubts that the warning it con-
veys is a proper one, but it is a warning which
can be given with equal efficacy by counsel or
* * * by the judge in his charge on the facts.
Common intelligence and caution, in the juror's
minds, will sufficiently appreciate it, without
laying on of the road [rod] in the shape of a
rule of law. Moreover, the danger which it is
supposed to guard against is greatly exagger-
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over, the "idea became encysted in a
phrase," and is now applied indiscrimi-
nately to every confession-whether it be
proven voluntary or not.
The rule is, however, apparently too
well established in the courts of the Fed-
eral Circuit to be easily overthrown, and,
in the words of Mr. Justice Learned Hand,
"k * we should not feel at liberty to dis-
regard a principle so commonly accepted,
merely because it seems to us that such
evils as it corrects could be more flexibly
treated by the judge at trial * * **"12 In
the case in which he made that statement,
he did not overthrow the rule, but he found
the defendant guilty by fitting the case
within the rule. It is our contention that
the court in the Gulotta case not only
should have done the same thing, but could
have done so, without a painful stretching
of the rule.
The court in the Gulotta case is appar-
ently guilty of a serious confusion of
terminology which leads it to erroneous
thought-processes. It states that the de-
fendant relied "upon the long-established
rule that 'extrajudicial confessions or ad-
missions are not sufficient to authorize a
conviction of crime, unless corroborated by
independent evidence of the corpus de-
licti.' "'i What the courts have meant, of
course, is that extrajudicial confessions are
not sufficient corroboration, and that ex-
trajudicial admissions are not sufficient,
either standing alone. The manner in
which the court uses the word "or" makes
the rule sound as though it were, "extra-
judicial confessions and admissions are not
sufficient corroboration of the corpus de-
licti." This contention is borne out by the
fact that later in the opinion, the court
says, "The rule that to warrant conviction
of a crime both confessions and admissions
must be corroborated by some independent
evidence * * *," and still later, "In the
ated in common thought. That danger lies
wholly in a false confession of guilt. Such con-
fessions, however, so far as handed down to us
in the annals of our courts, have been exceed-
ingly rare * * * . Such a rule might ordinarily,
if not really needed, at least be merely super-
fluous. But this rule, and all such rules, are
today constantly resorted to by unscrupulous
counsel as mere verbal formulas with which to
entrap the trial judge into an error of words in
his charge to the jury. These capabilities of
abuse make it often a positive obstruction to
absence of such showing admissions and
confessions are received with the caution
and under the necessity of some indepen-
dent proof of the corpus delicti * * *."14
Not one of the cases cited by the court
sustains the rule, when it is stated "con-
fessions and admissions." Each case deals
with either a confession alone, or admis-
sions alone, and in each of those cases,
the particular court did, or did not, find
sufficient corroboration of the corpus
delicti, outside the admission or confession.
In the Gulotta case, the court conditioned
itself to thinking "confessions and admis-
sions together must be corroborated" and
it was an easy misstep for it to fall into the
narrow holding of the case, that admissions
cannot be sufficient corroboration of the
corpus delicti.
Conceding, arguendo, that admissions of
the usual type could not be sufficient, it
seems to us that those appearing in the
principal case are of a different nature,
and should be given greater weight as
evidence. One of the admissions relied
upon by the prosecution to corroborate the
corpus delicti (the false representation of
citizenship), was a declaration of inten-
tion to become a citizen, signed, and filed
with a court by Gulotta, twenty years be-
fore this action took place. Such an ad-
mission is substantially stronger than an
admission made at or subsequent to the
commission of the crime.1 5 This was rec-
ognized in Gordnier v. United States0
when the court made this comment: "The
affidavits [in which defendant declared his
age, long prior to the action] which were
introduced in evidence against plaintiff
in error were not confessions, and they can
hardly be said to be admissions, not having
been against interest at the time when
they were made. * * * They would un-
doubtedly have been admissible in evi-
the course of justice." Wigmore, Evidence, §2070.
1l-Daeche v. United States, 250 Fed. 566, 571
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1918).
13 Gulotta v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 683, 685
(C. C. A. 8th, 1940) (italics added).
14 Id. at 686.
15 United States v. Gulotta, 29 F. Supp. 947, 950
(W.D. Mo. 1939).
-0 Gordnier v. United States, 261 Fed. 910
(C. C. A. 9th, 1920).
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dence ** *1,7 There was no full confes-
sion of the crime in that case, so that the
court might have said, in following the rec-
ognized restriction upon the rule: "Evi-
dence aliunde, however, as to the corpus
delicti, need not be such as to alone estab-
lish the facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is sufficient if, when considered in con-
nection with the confession, it satisfies the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the
offense was in fact committed, and the
plaintiff in error committed it."'
In the principal case we have a full con-
fession, and the fact that Gulotta went to
the authorities as an alien, to take out
citizenship papers. In addition there was
the passport about which the court was
forced to concede, "It was tendered by ap-
pellant to a naturalization official, however,
with the apparent intent that the facts
therein stated should be accepted as true.
It was within the discretion of the trial
court '.o receive it in evidence as an ad-
mission by the appellant that he was born
in Italy. * * * As such, it was cumulative
only."' 9 The court held, on the passport,
that it " * * was in no way authenticated
nor identified. It is not competent evi-
dence, therefore, to prove the facts stated
therein." It did not need to prove the
facts stated. Since the trial court could
"receive it in evidence," it would seem to
fall squarely within the rule of the Forte
case-"We do not rule that such corrobor-
ating evidence must, independent of the
confession, establish the corpus delicti be-
yond a reasonable doubt."20
It will be worthwhile to note a case de-
cided by the same court that decided the
Gulotta case, at the same term of court,
the opinion written by the same learned
justice. In the case of Gregg v. United
States,21 defendant was convicted of at-
17 Id. at 912.
18 Mangum v. United States, 289 Fed. 213, 216
(C. C. A. 9th 1923). See also Forte v. United
States, 94 F. (2d) 236, 240, 69 App. D. C. 111,
(App. D. C. 1937); Oldstein v. United States, 99
F. (2d) 305, 306 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938); Jordan v.
United States, 60 F. (2d) 4 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932),
cert. den. 287 U. S. 633; Wiggins v. United States,
64 F. (2d) 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933), cert. den. 54
S. Ct. 72.
tempting to transport intoxicating liquor
into the state of Kansas, though when ar-
rested he was 150 miles from the state line.
He confessed fully, and the court, in sus-
taining the conviction, had this to say:
"In this instance the independent evidence
introduced by the government corrobor-
ated the appellant's confession in every
essential detail. Apart from the confession
the evidence was sufficient to permit a
legitimate inference that the appellant's
destination was the state of Kansas. The
appellant's home was in Kansas. He was
traveling in the direction, but a few hours
distant from the Kansas line. Considered
with his confession and with the other cir-
cumstances shown by the government the
evidence warranted the jury in finding be-
yond a reasonable doubt that appellant in-
tended to transport the liquor into the
state of Kansas."
22
Comparing the two cases, we find: in the
Gregg case, the fact that Gregg carried a
load of liquor, lived in Kansas, and was
traveling in the general direction (though
150 miles away), corroborates the corpus
delicti (attempting to transport intoxicat-
ing liquor into the state). In the Gulotta
case, the fact that Gulotta presented him-
self as an alien to declare his intention to
become a citizen, showing a passport to
the authorities to convince them of the
truth of his words, does not corroborate
the corpus delicti (the false representation
of oneself as a citizen).
It is, at best, a discouraging task to find
the rational and fundamental reason be-
hind the variant holdings. It can be readily
done with the glib formula, "One was cir-
cumstantial evidence, the other, admis-
sions." It must be kept in mind that ad-
missions, as evidence in the Gulotta case,
19 Gulotta v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 683, 685(C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
20 Forte v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 236, 240
(App. D. C. 1937); cf. Litkofsky et al. v. United
States, 9 F. (2d) 877, 880 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925);
Duncan v. United States, 68 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A.
9th, 1933).
21 Gregg v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 687
(C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
22Id at 690.
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and the circumstances, as evidence in the
Gregg case, prove nothing conclusively in
themselves, but only as they point to the
actual wrong confessed to by the parties.
The idea "encysted in a phrase" has again
reared its serpentine head, and paralyzed
the judicial process with a glance.23
J. F. RYDSTROM
SILENCE BY ONE IN CUSTODY IN THE FACE OF ACCUSATION [ALABAMA]
The defendant, in the recent case of
Muse v. State,' was tried for robbery.
At the trial the prosecuting witness was
permitted to testify, over the objection
of the defendant, that he had identified
the defendant in a police station line-up
and that, when pointed out as the man
who had faken $4.10 from him, the de-
fendant had made no denial of the
charge but had remained silent. Several
officers were also permitted to state what
was said and done at the time of this iden-
tification. The defendant was convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment for twenty
years.2 He appealed to the Alabama Court
of Appeals and that court sustained the
trial court's ruling allowing the testimony
into evidence and affirmed the conviction.
Both a motion for rehearing and a writ of
23 Justice Otis who heard the case without a
jury in the District Court, had this comment to
make: "This is really a controversy between
highly technical requirements of law and the
substance of truth. If the case * * * had been
submitted to a jury, no one can doubt that a
verdict of 'guilty' would have been returned
almost instanter. Such a verdict might have
offended the letter of the law, it would not have
offended justice in the larger sense. The sole
reliance of the defendant was not on conscious-
ness of innocence, but on obstacles obtruded in
the prosecutor's path by rules of evidence."
United States v. GuTotta, 29 F. Supp. 947, 948
(W. D. Mo. 1939).
1196 S. 148 (Ala. Ct. of App., March, 1940.)
2 "Any person who is convicted of robbery
must be punished, at the discretion of the jury,
by death, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary
for not less than ten years,"Alabama Code (1928)
c. 227, §5460.
1 Naturally, the accused must have heard the
statement and understood that he was being
charged with a crime, before inference of
acquiescence in the accusation may be drawn.
However, it will be inferred or presumed that
he heard the statement if it is made in his
presence. It also follows that when the accused
is restrained from denying, no inference can be
drawn and the evidence will be held inadmis-
sible. See Wharton, Evidence in Criminal Cases
(11th ed. 1935) §§661, 662. In Bob v. State, 32
certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court
were denied.
Generally, silence in the face of the di-
rect accusation of a crime is admissible
as a circumstance to be considered by a
jury as tending to show guilt.3  Where
the accusation is made while the defendant
is in custody, however, the courts are
divided.4 In such a situation some courts
hold that such restraint destroys the basis
for an inference of acquiescence or failure
to controvert. "These courts maintain that
it is the common knowledge and belief of
men in general that silence while under
arrest is the proper procedure to protect
their interest, whether they be guilty or
innocent."5  Other tribunals hold that the
mere fact of arrest is not sufficient to ren-
der the testimony inadmissible, although
it is a circumstance to be considered by
Ala. 560 (1858), evidence of silence of a negro
slave accused of assault was not admitted be-
cause contradiction of the accusation would have
been "improper" and "insolent."
"It ought not to be necessary to note that the
party's denial of the third person's statement
destroys entirely the ground for using it." Wig-
more, Evidence (3rd. ed. 1940) §§ 1071, 1072.
The court in the principal case, citing Doby v.
State, 15 Ala. App. 591, 74 S. 724 (1917), remarks
that "Silence in the face of pertinent and direct
accusation of a crime, partakes of the nature of
a confession, (italics added) and is admissible
as a circumstance to be considered by the jury
as tending to show guilt . . ." Although courts
often speak of silence in such circumstances as
being an admission or confession, e.g., People v.
Tielke, 259 Ill. 88, 102 N. E. 229 (1913) and Davis
v. State, 131 Ala. 10, 31 S. 569 (1902), it is never
given the weight of a confession. See Note (1920)
34 Harv. Law Rev. 205; People v. Nitti, 312 Ill.
73, 92, 143 N. E. 448, 454 (1924).
4 See, generally, Wharton, Criminal Evidence,
§§121, 656, 661, 665; Wigmore, Evidence, §§272,
1129, 1130, 1071. Annotations, 25 L. R. A. (N. s.)
542, 558; 42 L. R. A. (N. s.) 890, 892; 80 A. L. R.
1235, 1259; 115 A. L. R. 1510, 1517.
5 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, §66. See cases
there cited. Wigmore states that the better rule
is to allow some flexibility according to the cir-
cumstances, §1072 and cases there cited.
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the jury.6 Alabama by a long line of de-
cisions is committed to this latter view.7
An accusation "would, of itself, be objec-
tionable as hearsay testimony, being a
statement made at some time other than at
a present trial offered to prove the truth
of the matter therein asserted, and based
entirely on the credibility of a declarer
not then before the court. However, as in
the case of admissions generally, the state-
ments .. .are not offered as evidence of
the truth merely because they were ut-
tered; they are secondary in nature and
are accepted in evidence as untainted by
the hearsay stigma because they are a
necessary predicate to the showing of the
substantive evidence the reaction of the
accused."" "Silence in the face of accusa-
tion is the evidentiary fact, and not the
accusation."9
However, if everything the accusor (in
the principal case, the prosecuting wit-
ness) said and did is to become part of
the accusation, much extraneous and
highly prejudicial testimony would be un-
fairly admitted.' 0 Where the line is to be
drawn, what statements should be ad-
mitted as showing an accusation and what
ones rejected may indeed become a prob-
lem; For example, in the principal case
a policeman witnessing the identification
was asked to state "'what Mr. Glenn did
or said when he went in the door where
those eight or ten darkies were.' And
6 The states that follow this rule include:
California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee and Wisconsin. Among those
that exclude the testimony when the accused is
in custody are: Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho,
Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South
Carolina.
7 People v. Lehne, 359 Ill. 631, 195 N. E. 468(1935); People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 263 Pac. 226(1928); Doby v. State, 15 Ala. App. 591, 74 S. 724(1917); Simmons v. State, 7 Ala. App. 107, 61 S.
466 (1913); Raymond v. State, 154 Ala. 1, 45 S.
895 (1908); Ray v. State, 50 Ala. 104 (1873).
8 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, §656.
9 Rowlan v. State, 14 Ala. App. 17, 70 S. 953,
955 (1916). See also Raymond v. State, 154 Ala.
1, 45 S. 895 (1908), dissent.
1o In Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky.
870, 878, 82 S. W. 592, 595 (1904), the court says,
"If silence [in the face of an accusation] .. .is
evidence of guilt, then one charged with crime
must, under penalty of himself creating most
damaging evidence against himself in support of
the policeman answered, 'he identified him
and he made mention of his teeth and hair,
and eyes, and face and everything, and
got a good look at him in the face and he
said positively it was him.'"" Such tes-
timony serves more to show how sure the
accusor was that the defendant was the
guilty party than it does to indicate an
accusation calling for a denial. 12 In addi-
tion it must be remembered that coming
from a third party such testimony is apt
to be tempered with impression and mis-
statement.' 3  It is no wonder that such
evidence has been called "dangerous," to
be received with "great caution."' 4
Furthermore, it is difficult to find any
psychological basis for the courts' general
conclusion that if one does not deny an
accusation he thereby tacitly admits his
guilt. The rule is seemingly the result
of an attempt by the courts to catagorize
human behavior into straight-jacket clas-
sifications; and since reactions to an ac-
cusation do not follow any standardized
pattern, the use of the rule must often
result in grossly unfair inferences. If, for
example, a man having just enough legal
knowledge to be "sure" of the proper
course of action while under arrest, stood
on his fancied legal rights in not denying,
he would soon find, in some states, that
his rights had been moved out from under
him. On the other hand, a timid bewil-
dered Mr. Milquetoast overwhelmed by
the charge, enter into a controversy with every
idle straggler who may choose to accuse him to
his face. He must parry every cross examination
attempted by every self-appointed questioner.
He must, though not addressed, continue to shout
denial of every fugitive statement tending to
implicate him that may reach his ears. He must
hazard answering accurately every statement so
made, or have his silence construed as evidence
of his having admitted not only what the witness
then said, but possibly now says was then said."
11 This testimony is set out in the Brief and
argument on rehearing for the defendant.
12 The testimony, at any rate, is far less certain
in indicating an accusation calling for denial
than the statement of another witness who testi-
fied that Glenn pointed out the defendant and
said, "that's the man that robbed me." From
the opinion of the Court of Appeals it is difficult
to tell just what opportunity the defendant had
to deny the charge made at the time of the
line-up.
'3See the latter part of the quotation from
Merriweather v. Commonwealth, supra n. 10.
14 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, §665.
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the gravity of his predicament, might re-
main mute. In either case, both would
have been much better off if, in the manner
of the hardened criminal personified by
the movie villain, they had denied the
accusation with a curt, "Brother, ya got
da wrong guy"! As Justice Redfield com-
mented in Mattock v. Lyman, "With some
men, perhaps, silence would be some
grounds of inferring assent, and with
others none at all. The testimony then
would depend upon the character and
habits of the party, which would lead to
the direct trial of the parties, instead of
the case."' 5
In Commonwealth v. Kenney the court
remarked that if the defendant is "re-
strained by fear, by doubts of his rights,
by a belief that his security will be best
promoted by his silence, then no in-
ference of assent can be drawn from that
silence. Perhaps it is within the province
of the judge, who must consider these pre-
liminary questions in the first instance, to
decide ultimately upon them."'
Manifestly, men under arrest may react
differently to an accusation. Lack of any
psychological measuring-stick to deter-
mine when silence under such circum-
stances is or is not an admission of guilt,
makes the admission or exclusion of such
evidence an arbitrary matter. At best,
when admitted, testimony of this nature
is dangerous, and is to be received with
great caution. Lest such dangerous testi-
mony be used to convict one who inno-
cently stands mute, is it not better than this
evidence be arbitrarily excluded?
MARVIN KOENIGSBERG.
COMMENTS BY THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ON OTHER INDICTMENTS
PENDING AGAINST THE ACCUSED [ALABAMA]
The appellant in the case of Gallman v.
State,' was charged with receiving and con-
cealing stolen property. Trial was had on
this single issue, the defendant was found
guilty, and the case then came before the
court of appeals. One of the exceptions
to the action of the trial court, involved
a remark by the states attorney that other
indictments were pending against the ac-
cused. The trial judge sustained an ob-
jection but refused to exclude this state-
ment from the record, and overruled
accused's motion that a mistrial be de-
clared; the court merely stating that it
did not think reference to the other in-
dictments was fair. The court of appeals
25 16 Vt. 113, 119 (1844).
25 53 Mass. 235, 237 (1847). But, as a practical
matter, every accused person faced with such
testimony would plead that he thought it to be
to his interest to remain silent, claiming that if
he had not thought so he would have denied
explicitly. The limitation, therefore, begs the
question; it offers no criterion to use, without
trying the parties rather than the case.
I (Ala. App.) 195 So. 768 (Feb. 13, 1940).
'Decennial, Criminal Law, 7221/, 730 (13);
Century Digest, Criminal Law, §§1668, 1669, 1670,
1675; Corpus Juris, Criminal Law, §2253; Hall v.
U. S., 150 U. S. 76 (1893); Ashby v. State, 25 Ala.
App. 207, 143 So. 242 (1932); People v. Helm, 152
in the instant case, reversed the trial
court's action in not excluding the im-
proper statement from the consideration
of the jury. The appellate court's argu-
ment was: that the solicitor did not say
for what offenses the indictments were,
nor for what reason they were mentioned;
and therefore the solicitor had deliberately
introduced this statement, in an effort to
create in the minds of the jury an in-
eradicable impression as to the type of
man the accused represented-which was
highly improper, and reversible error.
Remarks of this type by the prosecuting
attorney have been declared error,2 with
two exceptions to the rule.3 These have
Cal. 532, 93 P. 99 (1907); Bennett v. State, 62
Ark. 516, 36 S. W. 947 (1896); Sasse v. State, 68
Wis. 530, 32 N. W. 849 (1887); Whitfill v. State,
75 Tex. Cr. 169, 169 S. W. 681 (1914) (court did
not hear the improper remark of counsel, and
counsel for the accused did not thereafter make
his objection before the court; although if he
had, the court would have ruled in his favor);
Meadows v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 104 S. W. 954
t1907) (indictment read as to a similar crime
committed by the accused. Held to be error.
Very analogous to the principle case, note 1
supra); People v. Becker, 75 Ohio St. 407, 79
N. E. 929 (1907).
zCorpus Juris, Criminal Law, §2253.
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been recognized in cases (a) where there
is evidence on the record from which the
crime may be inferred; 4 and (b) if the
remarks are confined to the purposes for
which the proof has been admitted.5 Keep-
ing in mind that the cornerstone of justice
is that of a fair and impartial trial, and
using this as a criterion, those prosecuting
attorneys who willfully overstep this
boundary, should be decisively stopped by
the judge of the trial court, so as to give to
the accused the type of trial to which he
is, by law, entitled.,;
The foregoing considerations suggest the
final problem-having objected and the
case not falling within the two exceptions
to the rule, is such an error reversible
or not?
Many times we find the courts holding
such a statement by the state solicitor
error but not reversible, because it had
been removed from the jury's considera-
tion by the trial judge's action in excluding
the remark from the record and decisively
admonishing the jury to disregard it. 7 In
contrast to this, there are cases which hold
that the error is reversible, no matter how
strong the judge's remarks to the jury
have been as to disregarding the prose-
4 Johnson v. State, 134 Ala. 54, 32 S. 724 (1901)
(remark "oft repeated criminal" justified by
prior crimes on the record); People v. Cucchiette,
24 Cal. App. 495, 141 P. 933 (1914); Spahn v.
People, 137 Ill. 538, 27 N. E. 688 (1891).
5 Decennial, Criminal Law, 719; Century Digest,
Criminal Law, §1669; Bradburn v. U. S., 3 Indian
Ter. 604, 64 S. W. 550 (1901); Taylor v. State, 50
Tex. Cr. 560, 100 S. W. 393 (1907) (evidence
entered for the purpose of showing credibility
and no other use can be made of it); State v.
Kakarikos, 45 Utah 470, 146 P. 750 (1915) (testi-
mony to identify gun, then used to show an
arrest of defendant for another offence. This is
error); People v. Campbell, 173 Mich. 381, 139
N. W. 24 (1912).
6 The problem as to the admissibility of other
crimes is not covered in this note as it is a
separate problem of evidence. For reference see:
Annotations, 62 L. R. A. 193.
7 Burkett v. State, 215 Ala. 453, 111 So. 34 (1927)
(prompt instructions to disregard); Mynett v.
State, 179 Ark. 1199, 18 S. W. (2d) 335 (1929); State
v. Tucker, 190 N. C. 708, 130 S. E. 720 (1925)
(indiscretion must be corrected at trial and if
gross, the judge, must interfere at once); Com-
monwealth v. Touri, 295 Pa. 50, 144 Atl. 761 (1929).
8 Decennial, Criminal Law, §730; Century
cuting attorney's insinuations. 8 The courts
here say that the words are ineradicable,
and the effects cannot be removed from
the jurors' minds merely by words; and
hold a mistrial has resulted. A third cata-
gory is in the situation where the trial
court refuses to admonish the jury to dis-
regard, but tacitly or expressly approves
of the illegal insinuations by the prosecut-
ing attorney.9 In these cases the appellate
courts will usually, in the strongest lan-
guage, disaffirm the action of the lower
court, and remand for a new trial. A fourth
category is one in which there is a clear
preponderance of guilt (in the mind of the
court), and while there may have been
error; still the preponderance is so strong,
that the error is not regarded as predjudi-
cial and not of sufficient importance to
remand.1 0
The trend of these cases shows that the
remarks must be very unfair before the
appellate court will reverse the trial court,
where the latter has admonished the jury
to disregard. The appellate courts will
largely leave the determination, as to the
impropriety of a solicitor's remark, to the
trial court's discretion. 1 They will also
presume, in the case of a trial court's
Digest, Criminal Law, §1693; People v. Pantages,
212 Cal. 237, 297 P. 890 (1931); People v. Kolowich,
262 Mich. 137, 247 N. W. 133 (1933); Arcos v.
State, 120 Tex. Cr. 315, 29 S. W. (2d) 395 (1930)
(no hard and fast rule as to when remarks are
ineradicable, but must take into consideration
the facts and circumstances of each particular
situation); Gaston v. State, 95 Ark. 233, 128 S. W.
1033 (1910) (facts and circumstances control as
to when there is reversible error); People v.
Manganaro, 218 N. Y. 9, 112 N. E. 436 (1916);
State v. Nyhus, 19 N. D. 326, 124 N. W. 71, 27
L. R. A. (N. s.) 487, (1909) (words of general
caution are not enough).
10 State v. McBrien, 265 Mo. 594, 178 S. W. 489
(1914) (counsel told to go ahead with the argu-
ment. Appellate court held this to be highly
improper); State v. Netherton, 128 Kas. 564, 279
P. 19 (1929) (failure to admonish the jury is
highly improper); Fleming v. Commonwealth,
224 Ky. 160, 5 S. W. (2d) 899 (1928).
10 People v. Peeples, 70 Cal. App. 518, 162 P.
653 (1916) (evidence clearly supported conviction
and the court assumes that the jury followed the
instructions to disregard); People v. Duncan,
.261 Ill. 339, 103 N. E. 1043 (1913) (preponderance
as to guilt).
11 State v. Nichols, 327 Mo. 1237, 39 S. W. (2d)
777 (1931).
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admonition to the jury to disregard an
illegal insinuation, that the jury followed
the court's instructions.1
2
In a review of the cases, one becomes
keenly aware of the prevalent use of
illegal insinuations by the prosecution, and
the consequent need for as strong meas-
ures as possible to correct this abuse.
Courts should restrict remarks by the
prosecuting attorney, to the legal evidence,
and declare any off-side comments refer-
ring to past crimes, in an effort to predju-
dice the jury, as error amounting to a
mistrial. This might work a hardship in
the first few cases, where the state solicitor
was surprised by the strictness of the rule,
but it would serve as a check on further
attempts to give the jury an illegal and
unfair impression of the defendant. It must
be always kept in mind that the jury, with
the layman's approach to law, cannot help
but be materially affected by these un-
curbed statements, on the part of the State
-statements which render nugatory and
meaningless the defendant's supposed right
to a fair and impartial trial. Only by this
rigid prohibition, can irrational diatribes
by the prosecution, as to former crimes by
the accused, be obviated; and the accused
be given the right to have his case decided
by the laws of evidence and reason, rather
than by those of predjudice and emotion.
Edward H. Hatton.
THE DEGREE OF REASONABLENESS REQUIRED IN ARREST
WITHOUT A WARRANT [ILLINOIS]*
A holdup of a filling station was com-
mitted by two persons, one a short man,
and the other, an unidentified driver of a
black car. Twenty-four hours later three
police officers having this information saw
a person answering the description of a
short man in the hold-up get out of the
defendant's car two miles from the point
where the robbery had occurred. The
officers drove up to this car, and as they
did so, the defendant, who had been driv-
ing, got out. He refused to stop when com-
manded to do so by the officers and was
thereupon arrested without a warrant in
the tavern into which he had run. A
thirty-two caliber pistol was found on his
person, and a pistol, blackjack, rubber
gloves, and adhesive tape were found in
the glove compartment of his car.
The officers did not at that time know
that the person arrested was George
Henneman, a known "gun-toter"' and it
was only in their belief that he was an
accomplice in a robbery that they arrested
12 People v. Peeples, 70 Cal. App. 518, 162 P.
653 (1916).
* People v. Henneman, 373 Ill. 603, 27 N. E.
(2d) 448 (1940).
SThe defendant in this case had previously
been arrested and searched merely because
there was a report that suspicious looking
characters were in the neighborhood. Upon
the information gained from this search he was
convicted of the crime of carrying concealed
him. Henneman was tried and convicted
of the crime of carrying concealed weap-
ons. The Supreme Court of Illinois re-
versed the conviction because the arrest
was without sufficient cause, and there-
fore it was error for the lower court to
admit evidence obtained by the illegal
search. The police officers "had no evi-
dence, information or basis for suspicion
that the plaintiff in error had committed
a crime or was in any way implicated in
a crime, beyond the fact that a second man
appeared in the robbery with the man who
semed to answer the description of the
robber."2
Under the common law a constable did
not have the authority to arrest without a
warrant for misdemeanors committed out-
side of their presence. But he could arrest
where either a felony had been committed,
or he had a reasonable belief that one had
been committed and where he had a rea-
sonable belief that the person arrested had
committed it.3
weapons. The Supreme Court reversed saying
mere suspicion is an insufficient ground for
arrest and search without a warrant. 367 Ill.
151, 10 N. E. (2d) 649 (1932).
2 People v. Henneman, 373 IM. 603, 605, 27 N.
E. (2d) 448, 449 (1940), Wilson, C. J. and Shaw,
J. dissented without opinion.
3 IV Chesire, Stephens Commentaries on Laws
of England (19th ed. 1928), 187-189; Harris and
Wilshire, Criminal Law (15th ed. 1933) 345-348;
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In Illinois by statute "an arrest may be
made by an officer or by a private person
without a warrant, for a criminal offense
committed or attempted in his presence,
and by an officer, when a criminal offense
has in fact been committed and he has
reasonable grounds for believing that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
'4
"Criminal offense" as used in the statute
has been construed to include misde-
meanors as well as felonies." Whether
there are reasonable grounds to warrant
an arrest is a mixed question of law and
fact.0 "No general rule applicable to every
case has been, or probably can be an-
nounced as te what facts will constitute a
justification in law for an arrest without
a warrant, other than that such grounds
of suspicion exist as should influence the
conduct of a prudent and cautious man
under the circumstances."7 An arrest made
on mere suspicion or for questioning is
not enough to meet this test,8 and a dis-
covery of weapons after the arrest cannot
relate back and operate as a justification
for the arrest.9
It would seem that the police officers
would have reasonable grounds to suspect
a person sufficient to arrest him if an
Wilgus, Arrest without a Warrant (1924) 22
Mich. L. Rev. 541, 673; Hall, Legal and Social
Aspects of Arrest without a Warrant (1935)
49 Har. L. Rev. 566; Although police were un-
known at Common Law, they are generally
considered as having the same powers as
watchmen and constables. Shanley v. Wells,
71 IM. 78 (1873).
4 Smith-Hurd, Ill. Stat. (Perm. ed.) C. 38,
§657 (1935).
sCoughlin v. Whitmore, 132 Ill. App. 574
(1907); People v. Scalisi, 324 Ill. 131, 154 N. E.
715 (1926); People v. McGurn, 341 III. 632, 173
N. E. 754 (1930); People v. Roberta, 352 I1. 189,
185 N. E. 253 (1933); People v. Davies, 354 Ill.
168, 188 N. E. 337 (1933); People v. Ford, 356
11. 572, 191 N. E. 315 (1934).
6 People v. Scalisi, 324 IlL 131, 154 N. E. 715
(1926); People v. Roberta, 352 Ill. 189, 185 N. E.
253 (1933).
7 People v. Doody, 343 Ill. 194, 205, 175 N. E.
436, 442 (1931). See People v. Euctice, 371 Ill.
159, 20 N. E. (2d) 83 (1939); People v. Brown,
354 Ill. 480, 188 N. E. 529 (1934); People v.
Roberta, 352 IlL. 189, 185 N. E. 253 (1933) (where
officers were told by the girl inmates of a house
of ill-fame, that they were practicing prostitu-
tion and directed and pointed out to the officers
two men as "sluggers" the arrest and search
was upheld); People v. Kissane, 347 Ill. 385,
179 N. E. 850 (1932).
offense bad in fact been committed and
there were any facts known to the officers
that tended to associate him with that
offense as a possible perpetrator. The
Illinois courts have seemingly gone this far
in other cases; in People v. Brown0 the
arresting officer had no description other
than the make of the cars upon which to
base their arrest and search, yet it was
upheld although the criminals arrested
were not those sought; in People v.
Euctice1 the police stopped and searched
all cars on a certain route over which they
expected a fleeing criminal to pass, yet the
arrest of one of those searched was upheld
and there was a conviction for carrying
concealed weapons. Seemingly the only
argument against taking this position is
that arrests and searches based on slight
suspicion would inconvenience the inno-
cent persons affected but it would seem
that this would be greatly outweighed by
the public benefit resulting from increased
efficiency in the capture of criminals by
peace officers.
The search and seizure which follows a
lawful arrest whether with or without a
warrant is not unreasonable or an inva-
sion of the Constitutional provision against
8 People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632, 173 N. E. 754
(1930), noted 22 J. Crim. Law 589 (orders by a
superior officer to arrest where the arresting
officer has not any belief that the accused is
guilty of a criminal offense is insufficient);
People v. Humphreys, 353 Ill. 340, 187 N. E. 446
(1933) (An anonymous letter not naming the
accused who is arrested three months later on
the direction of a superior officer to bring him
in was held insufficient); People v. Ford, 356
Ill. 572, 191 N. E. 315 (1933) (a reputed member
of a gang suspected of kidnaping cannot be
arrested where the arresting officers did not
suspect him of participation); People v. Pon-
cher, 358 l1l. 73, 192 N. E. 732 (1933) (The
fact that the police saw a stolen car go into a
repair shop and drive away without some of
its parts did not justify an arrest and search
for receiving stolen goods).
9 People v. Macklin, 353 Ill. 64, 186 N. E. 531
(1933); People v. Ford, 356 Ill. 572, 191 N. E. 315
(1934).
20 354 Ill. 480, 188 N. E. 529 (1933). "The fact
that this was a Ford sedan, to which they might
have changed from a Ford with a rumble seat,
and that the Buick was the wrong Buick, did
not keep the officers from having reasonable
grounds . . ." 345 Ill. 480, 485, 188 N. E. 529,
530 (1933).
11371 Ill. 159, 20 N. E. (2nd) 83 (1939).
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illegal search and seizure, 12 but where the
evidence is taken as the result of an illegal
arrest and search there is a diversity of
opinion as to the admissibility of the evi-
dence so taken. The Federal and a growing
minority of State courts including Illinois
will not allow evidence obtained from an
illegal search and seizure to be admitted
in the trial of the case. They argue that a
suit for trespass is inadequate protection
against unlawful search and seizure and
to allow illegally obtained goods into evi-
dence would render the right practically
worthless.1 3 A majority of the state juris-
dictions, however, allow evidence illegally
obtained to be admitted in the trial of the
case if pertinent to the issue. 4 The reasons
given for this rule are: first, to avoid col-
lateral issues in the trial of the case' 5;
second, that the suit for trespass, though
not now strictly enforced, can be sufficient
to enforce the right against unlawful
search, especially since that is the only
method to enforce the right against search
by other private citizens"; and third, that
if the evidence were excluded criminals,
undoubtedly guilty, would be allowed to
go free simply because an officer unwit-
12 North v. People, 139 Ill. 81, 28 N. E. 966
(1891).
'3 Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Chafee,
The Progress of the Law (1922) 35 Harv. L.
Rev. 673, 694; Atkinson, Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 11; Neblach,
Underhills Criminal Evidence (4th ed. 1935)
§ 137; Wharton's Criminal Evidence (l1th ed.
1932) §§373, 771. However, according to the
minority rule timely application to suppress
the evidence must be made before trial, People
v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N. E. 728 (1923);
People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N. E. 112
(1924).
14Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.) §§2183,
tingly or over zealously made a wrongful
arrest and search.1
7
The states, following the minority doc-
trine and refusing to admit evidence
illegally obtained (even though pertinent)
should certainly apply the rule, as to the
reasonableness required in arrest without
a warrant, liberally and so make it less
difficult for law enforcing bodies to pro-
tect society against criminals. However,
they should go further and re-examine
the rule rejecting the evidence. "The ques-
tion is whether protection for the individ-
uals would not be gained at a dispropor-
tionate loss of protection for society. On
the one side is the social need that crime
shall be repressed. On the other, the so-
cial need that law shall not be flouted by
the insolence of office. There are dangers
in any choice.'' Yet the choice must be
made, and it would certainly seem that it
should be made in favor of the admission
of the evidence, for surely the constitu-
tional and statutory provisions against un-
lawful search were never meant to be a
shield behind which those guilty of crim-
inal offenses could safely hide.
JoHN C. VOGEL
2184; Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Search and Seizure (1925), 19 IM. L. Rev. 303;
Knox, Self Incrimination (1925), 74 Penn. L.
Rev. 139; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures (1921), 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361.
15 State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616
(1938).
' Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519,
32 N. E. 910 (1893); People v. DeFore, 242 N. Y.
13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926).
1 State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 A.
636 (1924); People v. DeFore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150
N. E. 585 (1926).
-People v. DeFore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24, 150 N.
E. 585, 589 (1926).
